What the agent sends to the cloud
What the agent does not send
- Raw PromQL query strings.
- Raw HTTP request bodies, response bodies, or response headers.
- DNS resolver responses. A configured
expected_valueis matched on the agent; only the reading is sent. - TLS certificate chains or certificate details. Only the reading (days until expiry) is sent.
- Credentials. Secret values named by
*_reffields stay on the agent host: database connection strings, mTLS certificates and keys, auth tokens, secret request headers (header_refs), and secret gRPC metadata (metadata_refs). The cloud stores only the env var names; the agent reads the values locally at probe time. - Raw query responses: result sets, response bodies, and log lines behind a reading stay on the host.
- Agent logs, unless you set
BROADCAST_LOGS=true(off by default). - Any metric series outside the explicit metric definitions.
What the cloud sends to the agent
The response toGET /api/agent/metrics-definitions, the heartbeat
acknowledgement, and pending jobs: probe tests (a draft
source_type, source_config and thresholds) and CloudWatch “list
available metrics” requests. The definitions response shape
is the projection in the public @observer/protocol package’s
MetricDefinition type. The heartbeat acknowledgement carries a
few counters and an opaque definitions version string (see the
heartbeat payload reference);
it never carries instructions or configuration beyond telling the
agent that its definitions changed.
The cloud has no path back into your network. It cannot pull from
your Prometheus, hit your endpoints, or query your DNS. Every
probe runs from the agent’s vantage point.
Why this mattersThe agent fits networks where outbound HTTPS is the only allowed
path: one connection to the cloud plus the probe targets you
define, and no inbound connections.
Trust assumptions
- The agent trusts the cloud’s TLS certificate by default. Set
SKIP_SSL_VERIFICATION=truein development only. - The cloud trusts the agent only after the agent presents a
valid
AGENT_KEY. Keys are bound to a single agent identity and a single organisation. - A compromised agent key affects only that agent’s pushes. The cloud restricts each request to the agent’s own organisation; a stolen key cannot read or write across tenants.

